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The need to evaluate the impact of remittances in Ecuador arose as one of the outcomes of a previous study on bilateral economic relations between Spain and Ecuador (Olivié, 2008). That paper was meant to evaluate both the positive and negative social and economic effects of bilateral flows on Ecuador. This proved to be no simple task. According to official estimates, migrant remittances could represent as much as 80% of total exchange rate inflows from Spain; but updated data were scarce, as were academic papers recording or evaluating the main features or development outcomes of migrants’ transfers.​[4]​
This vacuum was striking alongside the recent proliferation of reports by multilateral organizations (Inter-American Development Bank, International Labor Organization, World Bank) and academic papers (Carling, 2005; López-Córdova and Olmedo, 2006; Ratha, 2003 and 2005) that underline the high and increasing magnitude of international flow –especially to Latin America– and that explore its positive effect on development in recipient countries. Moreover, in the particular case of Ecuador, there are important economic policy implications. On the one hand, according to official figures, remittances, and increasing oil prices, are significantly contributing to balance- of-payments equilibrium in Ecuador,​[5]​ thus determining the macro policy articulated in that country. Although Ecuador has recorded migration flows for several decades, the financial crisis in 1999 triggered an important wave of migration, mostly to Spain, resulting in an increased flow of remittances to Ecuador at the beginning of this decade. On the other hand, donor states recording significant inflows of migration have recently begun designing and implementing co-development programs. Such programs seek to link communities of origin (Ecuador, in this case) and destination (Spain, for instance) and to include remittances as a factor. Therefore, such cooperation assumes that remittance recipients are potential stakeholders of international assistance (i.e., poor).
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the academic literature on the development outcomes of migrants’ remittances. Specifically, for the case of Ecuador, we intend to test, on the basis of newly collected data, whether this inflow consistently contributes to development by improving health and education conditions in Ecuador.




Generally speaking, academic literature on remittances can be divided into three groups: (i) analyses of the reasons to remit (altruism, exchange, insurance, investment, and inheritance​[6]​ (Cox et al., 1998; Gosh, 2006; IMF, 2005; López-Córdova and Olmedo, 2006; Rappoport and Docquier, 2005; Solimano, 2003)); (ii) research on transferring channels, transferring costs, or policy options for reducing these costs (see, for instance, IMF (2005), Orozco (2006), and Orozco and Fedewa (2006)); and finally (iii), a vast body of literature on the impact of remittances on development in receiving countries, mostly highlighting human capital and macroeconomic effects. This literature review focuses on the latter. 
There is little disagreement over the importance and stability of this flow as a source of external financing (Gosh, 2006; Ratha, 2003; World Bank, 2006) and, therefore, its capacity to balance the external account (e.g., by compensating current-account deficits), to fill the gap of domestic savings, to feed local financial systems, or to improve the receiving country’s capacity to access foreign financing.​[7]​ In the case of Ecuador, several studies point to the fact that migrants’ remittances are now the second-largest source of external financing after oil revenues (Olivié, 2008). The high volume and stability of remittances therefore contrast with the low and concentrated or volatile access of developing countries to alternative sources of funds, such as foreign direct investment in the first case, or official assistance and private credit in the second (Ratha, 2003). Moreover, several studies underline that remittances may record counter-cyclical behavior, increasing in times of economic recession or financial crises in destination countries. This would mean that remittances have also become a mechanism for absorbing adverse shocks (Molina, 2006; World Bank, 2006).
A second commonly accepted assumption involves the impact of remittances on development through their capacity to alleviate poverty. There is common belief in a direct link connecting migrant remittances with poverty reduction and human development –better education, wider access to health care– thus facilitating the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Academic articles on this topic cover a wide range of countries and impact variables, and they come to very diverse conclusions. According to the World Bank (2006), remittances do tend to reduce poverty, have a weak impact on inequality, and lead to higher household expenses in health and education. More precisely, Adams and Page (2005) estimate the impact of migration and remittances on inequality and poverty for 71 countries and find that a 10% increase in remittances reduces the proportion of individuals living below the poverty line by 3.5%.​[8]​
According to Acosta et al. (2007b), remittances have the capacity of lowering poverty in Latin America. Every 1% increase in remittances as a proportion of GDP leads to a 0.37% poverty reduction in this region. However, the impact on poverty varies from country to country and depends on initial levels of income inequality. On the basis of balance-of-payments data and national household surveys, Acosta et al. (2007a) evaluate the impact of remittances on poverty, education, and health in eleven Latin American countries​[9]​ and conclude that a moderate but positive impact on poverty reduction does exist. The authors also observe strong regional heterogeneity regarding this impact.​[10]​ Fajnzylber and López (2007) come to the same conclusion: remittances have a positive but weak impact on poverty reduction, equality, growth, and investment. Acosta et al. (2008) find a positive impact on education expenditures and enrollment rates, as well as on health spending, and on anthropometric indicators in the lowest quintiles in El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. However, results for Mexico prove insignificant, while a positive impact on savings is seen among the lowest income groups throughout the region as a whole. On the other hand, López-Córdova (2006) finds positive results for Mexico, where infant mortality and child illiteracy (ages 6 to 14) decline as a consequence of remittances. Inter-American Dialogue (2007) finds signs of an impact on poverty by flows from the United States to Latin America –including improved diets and housing conditions– partly due to a concentration of remittances in low-income rural households. Gosh (2006) points out that the majority of migrants are non-poor. Therefore, Gosh sees an indirect link (if any) with poverty reduction in migrants’ home countries, as a consequence of the spill-over effect of flows received by non-poor migrants’ relatives. The same report does acknowledge the existence of poor households among recipients, as well as the capacity of collective remittances to improve infrastructure in hometown communities. However, poor people are a minority of remittance recipients.
Other papers find a positive influence of remittances on education outcomes in some countries. See for instance Cox, Edwards, and Ureta (2003), or Acosta (2007), for analyses of El Salvador, or Yang (2004) for analysis of the Philippines.
In the particular case of Ecuador, Acosta et al. (2007a) find a weak impact of remittances on poverty reduction at the national level, but a significant impact for individual receiving households. The same study observes a positive impact on education, and specifically on years of accumulated schooling, although this is limited to urban areas. The study also acknowledges a weaker impact by remittances on development in Ecuador, as compared to other countries analyzed therein. Calero et al. (2008) find similar results. In Ecuador, remittances have a positive effect on both school enrollment and child labor, especially among girls in rural areas. In addition, Pacheco (2007) finds no significant effects by remittances on students’ cognitive achievement among children from rural areas. Guerrero (2007) finds no significant effects by remittances on health spending. According to Acosta et al. (2006), remittances might have helped 5% of Ecuador’s population out of poverty between 2001 and 2002. This limited impact is the result of the concentration of remittances in non-poor families. 




What is the exact volume of remittance inflows in Ecuador?

As shown in the previous section, the bulk of recent reports and updated data on remittances published by multilateral organizations like the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) underline the high volume of remittances relative to the size of recipient economies, particularly for Latin America.​[13]​ According to the Multilateral Investment Fund, Latin America and the Caribbean received US$62,300 million in remittances in 2006; that is, 15% more than the previous year. This figure includes remittances to Ecuador: US$2,900 million in 2006. The World Bank records similar figures: US$2,922 million in 2006 and an expected increase to US$3,178 million in 2007.​[14]​
Other official sources at the national level indicate similar amounts. According to Banco de España (central bank of Spain), Spain’s remittances to Ecuador amounted to US$1,453 million in 2006.​[15]​ This figure is slightly higher that recorded by Banco Central de Ecuador (central bank of Ecuador): almost US$1,300 million coming from Spain; that is, 44.2% of total flows from all origins.​[16]​ Data from Banco Central de Ecuador coincide with World Bank and IADB figures (See table 1).
There are well-known problems in dealing with remittance figures. Perhaps the most common is the inability of central banks to totally capture this flow, since a significant portion is transferred through informal financial channels. In this sense, some authors recommend household surveys in order to assess the effective volume of transfers (see, for instance, Álvarez et al. (2006) and Hernández-Coss (2005)). This is precisely what Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC, the national statistics office) did in Ecuador. However, the most recent national household survey (Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida) in 2006 revealed a significantly lower volume of transfers. According to this source, Ecuadorian households received US$732 million in 2006, of which US$322 million came from Spain​[17]​. A higher figure is published by Jiménez-Martín et al. (2007), in a study that estimates the volume and destination of remittances both inside and outside the European Union. This research identifies Spain-Ecuador as one of the main remittances “corridors”. In 2004, the estimated flow through this corridor was €571.4 million, or approximately US$711 million.
The considerable differences between various sources of data might be attributed to an overvaluation of remittances by central banks reporting to multilateral organizations; to an undervaluation by INEC and Jiménez-Martín et al. (2007); or to both. Actually, data published by Banco de España is also just an estimation of this flow; it is not entirely based on reporting by the financial system. As explained by Álvarez et al. (2006), this came as a response to the low volume of remittances being recorded by the reporting system. Inflows from Spanish migrants to Northern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s were still exceeding outflows to developing countries, despite the huge immigration inflows recorded by Spain since the 1990s. In pursuing this exercise, Banco de España may have designed a model that overestimates remittance flows.





What is the distribution of remittances among quintiles?​[18]​

According to INEC data collected in 2006, remittances are distributed among quintiles as shown in Table 2. The quintile that concentrates the highest proportion of remittances is quintile 4 (43% of total transfers), followed by quintile 5 (just over 34%), quintile 3 (at 17.04%), quintile 2 (less than 4%) and, in the last position, quintile 1 (slightly more than 2%). Actually, the two richest quintiles (4 and 5) concentrated more than 77% of total remittance inflows in 2006. Like other Latin American countries, Ecuador records high rates of income inequality,​[19]​ which explains the very wide range of income in quintile 5 (starting at $275/month and rising to as high as $7,427/month​[20]​ (see Table 2)).​[21]​ 




What are remittances used for?

Answering this question, and evaluating the impact of remittances on social indicators, has required the collection of new data, as information provided by INEC was not sufficient. For a detailed description of the database, see Box 1. One of our goals in collecting new data on remittances was to get a clearer picture of how this foreign inflow is consumed or invested, in order to more precisely evaluate its potential impact on development. For this reason, individuals were asked how they used the money received from abroad –four principal uses ranked by volume– and how much money was devoted to each of these uses. This yielded precise information on the end-uses of remittances in Ecuador. In the first place, the total volume of remittances reported by end-use amounts to US$173,162,386; or 81.88% of total remittances according to previous determination of the volume of money received. Next, the eleven options given to respondents in this question allowed fair distinction among the end-uses chosen by remittance recipients, with only 4.33% of remittances going to “other” uses (see Table 3).
According to this information, remittances are mainly used to buy food (43.55% of the total). The second heading, education, accounts for 18.14% of total remittances. After debt reimbursement (which ranks third), health is the fourth most important use of remittances, accounting for just 7.63% of the total. Also, remittances are concentrated in a small number of uses: these four headings account for 77.62% of total remittances. The remaining eight options –clothes, housing, others, savings, vehicles, special occasions, electrical appliances, and investing in a business– collectively absorb only 22.38% of the flow.
This distribution may have several implications in relation to remittances’ impact on development. Food purchase can have a significant impact on development, following the MDGs definition, if this purchasing is concentrated in most vulnerable groups. If so, remittances may be acting as a survival mechanism for the poorest households. If, on the contrary, food is mainly purchased by highest income quintiles, the effect on development would be diluted. As shown in Table 2, remittances are concentrated in quintiles 4 and 5 (the richest). Therefore, the possibility that increased food purchase may help lift the lowest quintiles out of poverty remains low. Quintiles 1 and 2 (the poorest) spend more on food than the average, at 60.67% and 62.44%, respectively. Although this proportion drops in quintiles 3 to 5, food purchase is still concentrated among the non-poor: slightly less than 92% of total food consumption relative to total remittances received occurs in quintiles 3, 4, and 5, with slightly more than 8% going to quintiles 1 and 2.
Spending in health and education may contribute to development, in the medium and long term, through human capital formation and poverty reduction. These two headings account for only 25.77% of total remittances by end-uses. The proportion dedicated to education increases in quintiles 2 and 3 (at 19.61% and 18.99%, respectively) relative to quintile 1 (at 11.48%). But, surprisingly, this proportion falls to 15.80% in quintile 4. This is the lowest proportion devoted to spending in education and it corresponds to the very population receiving the highest proportion of remittances, according to data on remittances received. The proportion of health spending relative to the total volume of remittances spent increases with income: quintile 1 spends 1.92% of total remittances on health, while quintile 5 spends almost 11%. Nonetheless, as already underlined, overall health spending still accounts for less than 8% of total remittances.
Other uses that could have a significant impact on development, such as saving or investing in a business, register almost zero. It can be said that remittance recipients tend not to save this income, regardless of their quintile. Saving rates vary from 1.99% in quintile 4 to 4.79% in quintile 5. Actually, the fact that quintile 4 (the group receiving the highest proportion of remittances) saves less than any other is very revealing of the role that remittances play in Ecuador. Meanwhile, quintiles 1, 2, and 3 don’t use remittances to invest in businesses. This heading, which is the lowest proportional option for remittance end-use in Ecuador, is concentrated in quintile 5.
It is difficult to say whether these results are consistent with Bendixen’s  previous analysis (2003) on the use of remittances in Ecuador, as the end-use headings in the Bendixen paper are broader: daily spending, long-term investment, and luxury goods. However, we can locate two differences: Bendixen identifies a higher proportion of long-term investment (22%), and the same study observes a decline in daily expenses –rent, food, medicine– and an increase in investment and luxury products as the income goes up. Again, these differences can be explained by methodological differences, by changing patterns in remittance use, or by both. 
According to Orozco (2005), Ecuadorians receiving remittances from the United States spend less in coping with basic household needs than does the overall population. This might indicate higher income in households receiving funds from the United States, which would be consistent with Ecuador’s migration patterns.​[22]​ 





To evaluate the impact of remittances we take advantage of the fact that migrants receive remittances through formal banks and money-transfer companies. Using the data annexed to the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), we found that individuals receiving remittances preferentially use the institutions reported in Table 4, which differentiates banks and money-transfer companies. The formal banks most used to receive transfers are: Banco Bolivariano, Servipagos, Banco del Pichincha, Banco de Guayaquil, Banco del Austro, and Produbanco. These account for 90% of total remittances received through the formal banking system. At the same time, Delgado Travel, Western Union, and Money Gram account for 87% of total of remittances received through money-transfer companies. In this regard, the probability of receiving remittances will be higher among those living in a parish where any of these financial intermediaries are located. We assume that the presence of these institutions is not related to the outcome variables used in the following models. One potential problem with our instrument is that the availability of banks and/or money-transfer companies could be correlated with the local economic environment. Thus do we include some variables at parish level, as well as cantonal fixed effects, in order to dilute this threat. 
We will estimate several forms of the following equation, where Yi is the outcome variable:
					(1)
We will evaluate the effect of remittances on several aspects of human development, such as school enrollment for children aged 6 to 15; child malnutrition; prevalence of respiratory diseases and diarrhea among children aged under 5; and access to health services among those who were sick during the two weeks prior to data collection. In addition, we will evaluate the impact on certain areas of consumption: log of per capita consumption; log of consumption of food; log of education expenditures; log of health expenditures, and so on. Xi is a vector of individual, household, and community (parish) level characteristics. Ri is the treatment variable and refers to the monthly amount of remittances received by the household. Our parameter of interest is .
We use three different specifications. The first specification only includes the amount of remittances received by the household (the treatment variable). Specification two includes, in addition, some individual and household variables: sex and age at the individual level; and age, sex, schooling level, and dummy variables for self-defined ethnicity for the head of household. Finally, the third specification includes some parochial-level variables (average years of schooling, per capita income) as well as cantonal dummies (around 240); this last specification being the most complete and the main specification used in our analysis.
As already mentioned, to address potential biases caused by the endogeneity of the treatment variable (Ri), we apply an instrumental-variables approach where the amount of remittances received is instrumented by an indicative variable (taking a value of 1 if the parish has any of the banks or money-transfer enterprises reported in Table 4, or a value of 0 if it does not). This means that we will estimate a first-stage equation in which the endogenous variable R in equation (1) is instrumented by the presence (or lack) of transmission institutions at parish level (Z). Therefore, the identifying assumption is that . 
In addition to equation (1) we also present results from reduced-form estimation. This equation has a specification similar to equation (1), except that R is replaced by Z. 




The first thing that must be established is the first-stage effect of the availability of money-transfer institutions on the amount of remittances. Using the same three specifications mentioned above we find that the presence of money-transfer institutions has a significant and positive association with the amount of remittances. The coefficient remains positive and significant through all three specifications. Having a money-transfer institution in the parish increases the amount of remittances by around US$8 per month (see Table 5). In all cases the F test for the instrument is significant.
Next, we estimate the effect of remittances on consumption. Regarding total consumption, and using the log of per-capita consumption, OLS results show that people who receive remittances record higher consumption than those who do not. Results for the reduced form and the two-stage least square (2SLS) are significant and positive, and remain significant under the three specifications. In this case, two-stage results show that increasing the amount of remittances by US$10 each month increases the general per capita consumption by around 9% (see Table 6). 
For the log of expenditures in food, the two-stage estimates are not robust. These are significant under specification 1 and 2, but become insignificant under specification 3.
We also evaluate the effect of remittances on child malnutrition. In this case the dependent variable is the Z score. Results show a significant and positive effect under the reduced-form estimates, but no significant estimates under the two-stage estimates (see Table 8). 
We find significant and positive results for the log of education and health expenditure. Tables 9 and 10 introduce the results. Regarding education, increasing the amount of remittances by US$10 increases education spending by 18%. Regarding health, increasing the amount of remittances by US$10 increases health spending by 25%.
In evaluating the effect of remittances on access to health services, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the person attended a health center while sick, and 0 if not. Despite the results on health expenditure, OLS estimates show no significant difference in the access to health services between those who receive remittances and those who do not. The result remains the same throughout the three specifications used. However, results of the reduced form show a significant and positive effect of remittances on access to health centers. The two-stage results are not robust. We find a significant and positive impact under specifications 1 and 2, but the coefficient becomes insignificant under specification 3 (see Table 11). 
Tables 12 and 13 evaluate the effect of remittances on the prevalence of diarrhea and respiratory diseases in children aged 5 or less. In either case, we find no significant effects.
Table 14 shows the effect of remittances on school enrollment. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates show that the amount of remittances has a small but significant association with school enrollment. Through the three specifications, the coefficient is significant and positive. The reduced-form estimates show no robust results, being significant and positive under specifications 1 and 2, but becoming insignificant under specification 3. Finally, the two-stage estimates, which report the local average treatment effect, show no robust estimates. The coefficient is significant under specification 1, but not significant under specifications 2 and 3. In sum, we find no significant effects of remittances on school enrollment, despite the fact that we find a positive result on education expenditures. 

c) What do they do with the money?

Although we find significant and positive effects on education and health expenditures, we have not found significant effects on outcome variables of human development. The main question that arises is how this increase in expenditure is used. In the case of education we explore the possibility of transferring children from public to private schools. In fact, we find that remittances increase the probability of attending private schools. Table 15 shows that increasing the amount of remittances by US$10 increases the probability of attending private schools by 6%. Migrating from public to private school could have a positive effect on students’ cognitive achievement. However, comparison of test score results for private and public schools reveals no strong differences. Table 16 shows the results of cognitive tests for the third, seventh and tenth grades in both language and mathematics. In general, Ecuador has a serious problem related to students’ cognitive achievements. Out of 20 possible points, a mark of at least 13 was required to pass on to the next level. On average, a majority of students fail each school grade. Although differences do exist between private and public schools, the performance of private schools, while better than that of public schools, is still insufficient to pass the grade. 
In the case of health, however, we find no significant effects of remittances on the probability of having private health insurance, nor on the probability of using private health centers when sick (Tables 17 and 18).  However, we do find significant and positive differences in the buying of medicines (Table 19). In Ecuador, during 2006, those who became ill and received some treatment in public health centers had to buy medicines at their own expense. Because some medicines are quite expensive, some people did not complete their treatment. Therefore, the positive impact on medicines could be associated with the possibility of receiving complete medical treatment. 

d) Is it a matter of time?





The main conclusion of this paper is that remittances do not have a significant impact on long-term human development outcome variables. 
This result is supported by the impact evaluation carried out in section 3. In the first place, remittances have no impact on education and health performance indicators. They do, however, have an impact on consumption and, more precisely, on education and health expenditures. Secondly, we find significant effects of remittances on the transfer of children from public to private schools, although performance indicators of private schools register only slightly better than those of the public system. Thirdly, we find that people receiving remittances purchase more medicines and are more likely to undergo complete medical treatment when sick than those not receiving remittances.  Overall, this could mean that remittances have a positive and significant effect on reducing short-term poverty, but no effect on expanding people’s long-term capabilities. 
In general terms, our results do not coincide with those found at the international level (World Bank, 2006; Adams and Page, 2005) or at the regional level (Acosta et al., 2007a and b; Fajnzylber and López, 2007; InterAmerican Dialogue, 2007). In the first case, apart from the fact that these studies analyze global trends that can obscure wide disparities among countries and regions, we should bear in mind that they are generally based on official statistics. As shown in the second section, these sources may overvalue, for certain countries, the exact amount of remittances. Although remittances seem to have a positive effect on Latin American development, regional analyses point out that significant differences exist from one country to another. For instance, Acosta et al. (2007a) find a much weaker impact on poverty reduction in Ecuador than in other countries. Moreover, Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) and Acosta (2007) find a positive impact in El Salvador, as does Yang (2004) in his analysis of the Philippines.
Therefore, the fact that our results do not coincide with those found by other authors can be explained by (i) the disparity of remittance impacts from one country to another, according to factors such as the socioeconomic characteristics of migrants; (ii) the quality of official data used for international analyses; and (iii) methodological differences in impact evaluations. In that sense, one key question is whether Ecuador is an exception to the rule. Is it one of very few countries not recording an impact of remittances on human capital development, or would similar results be found for other countries? As methodological differences might explain the positive results found by other studies of Latin Amercian countries, this question might best be answered by applying the methodology used in this study to explore the effects of remittances on other countries, thus enabling consistent comparisons between countries.
Regarding political implications, the section highlighting some stylized facts on remittances in Ecuador shows that it should perhaps not be assumed that remittances are contributing very much (as Central Bank data show) to balance-of-payments equilibrium. As alternative sources of data (such as INEC) show lower figures for remittances, macroeconomic management –foreign debt, external trade– might need to be based on more cautious estimates of foreign inflows. Secondly, internal development policies should take into account the scope of the impact of remittances on development, at least at the individual and household levels. Social policies and programs should be based on this result.
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Box 1. Data description


Table 1: Remittance estimates according to different sources (2006, US$  millions)
	Banco de España	Banco Central de Ecuador	INEC	FEDEA
Ecuador total	-	2,916 (b)	732 (c)	-
Spain - Ecuador	1,453 (a)	1,289 (b)	322 (c)	711 (d)
(a)	Banco de España (2006), “Balanza de pagos y posición de Inversión Internacional de España” and online data. Same source for euro-dollar applied exchange rate –average of daily exchange rates– (1 euro = 1.2556 $)
(b)	Banco Central de Ecuador, online data (http://www.bce.fin.ec/frame.php?CNT=ARB0000985 (​http:​/​​/​www.bce.fin.ec​/​frame.php?CNT=ARB0000985​))
(c)	INEC, online data (http://www.inec.gov.ec/web/guest/descargas/basedatos/inv_socd/con_vid (​http:​/​​/​www.inec.gov.ec​/​web​/​guest​/​descargas​/​basedatos​/​inv_socd​/​con_vid​))
(d)	Jiménez-Martín et al. (2007). Figure for 2004, originally expressed in US$. Source (a) for applied exchange rate –average of daily exchange rates– (1 euro = 1.2439 $.)

Table 2: Remittances by income distribution, Ecuador
	quintile 1	quintile 2	quintile 3	quintile 4	quintile 5
Remittances ($)	4,254,277	7,796,783	36,048,886	90,946,070	72,449,148
Remittances (% of total)	2.01	3.69	17.04	43.00	34.26
Recipients (number)	3,053	7,641	22,597	45,134	47,635
Average income	43.08	84.86	130.41	207.94	522.89




Table 3: Remittance uses by income distribution (2007, US$ and %)
	quintile 1	quintile 2	quintile 3	quintile 4	quintile 5	total
Housing and land (building, purchasing, or enlargement) 	194,751	161,709	3,385,626	1,005,026	3,796,118	8,543,230
	(5.44) (a)	(2.45)	(8.78)	(1.68)	(5.89)	(4.93)
















Debt reimbursement (other than previous destinations)	76,903	0	1,883,711	8,764,530	3,663,276	14,388,420
	(2.15)	(0)	(4.88)	(14.62)	(5.68)	(8.31)





(a) parentheses indicate %.

















Table 5. First-stage estimates




Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 6. Impact of remittances on log of per capita consumption 












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 7. Impact of remittances on log of food expenditure












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 8. Impact of remittances on child malnutrition
OLS	 	 	 












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 9. Impact of remittances on log of education expenditure 












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 10. Impact of remittances on log of health expenditure 












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 11. Impact of remittances on access to health services












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 12. Impact of remittances on prevalence of diarrhea












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 13. Impact of remittances on prevalence of respiratory diseases












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 14. Impact of remittances on school enrollment












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 15. Impact of remittances on the probability of attending private schools












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.


Table 16. Test scores for students in Ecuador (out of 20).

Grade	 	3rd	7th	10th









Source: Ministry of Education of Ecuador. Based on Aprendo. Several years. 

Table 17. Impact of remittances on the probability of having private health insurance












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 18. Impact of remittances on the probability of going to private health centers when sick












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 19. Impact of remittances on medicine expenditures












Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates corrected by heteroskedasticity and parish autocorrelation. *Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.

Table 20. Length of time that people have been receiving remittances
(percentage of total)











Data come from the Living Standard Measurement Survey of Ecuador of 2006 (LSMS 2006). The Ecuadorian survey has the same structure as any other LSMS around the world. It includes a complete list of all household members, and a consumption module that allows us to differentiate items such as food, education, health, housing, etc. In addition, the survey has some variables on education, health, and nutrition that provide information on access to school, school attendance, child malnutrition, access to health services, childhood diseases, and so on. The survey also includes information at the household level: housing conditions, expenditures on housing, and some additional infrastructural variables, as well as some assets of the household.
The sample has a stratified multiphase design where the first level is given by the strata; within each stratum housings were selected, and in each housing one household was interviewed. The sample size is 55,666 individuals corresponding to 13,581 households. From this total, 2,782 persons declared to have received remittances during the last twelve months.
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^4	  Exceptions include Acosta et al. (2006 and 2008b), Bendixen (2003), Bertoli (2008), and Solimano (2003). 
^5	  According to official data from the central banks of Ecuador and Spain (Banco Central de Ecuador and Banco de España).
^6	  These are the main reasons to remit according to López-Córdova and Olmedo (2006).
^7	  Exceptions are made of some studies (like Shaw (2005)) that find a decrease in New Zealand’s remittance flows to Samoa related to family reunion or the death of relatives in the migrants’ country of origin. This risk of depletion is also pointed out by Muliania (2005).
^8	  The impact found on poverty reduction is stronger than that of a previous analysis which concluded that, on average, a 10% increase in the share of international remittances in a country’s GDP could lead to a 1.6% decline in the share of people living in poverty (Adams and Page, 2003).
^9	  Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru.
^10	  Heterogeneity of results is frequently mentioned in remittance and migration literature (see also Fajnzylber and López, 2007). This feature shows the deficiencies inherent in cross-country approaches, reinforcing the need for case-by-case country studies.
^11	  Actually, Martínez (2007) finds evidence in Ecuador of Dutch disease, a phenomenon that is generally associated with increases in consumption levels.
^12	  For further analyses of the impact of remittances, a comprehensive literature review classifying short-and long-run effects can be found in Rappoport and Docquier (2005).
^13	  See, for instance, MIF-IADB (2004 and 2006).
^14	  This increase could be partly explained by exchange rate variations (dollar-euro), as a significant proportion of remittances outflow from Spain. 
^15	  Total remittance outflows from Spain amount to €6,807 million. Banco de España has recorded a 37.9% increase in total remittance outflow over the previous year.
^16	  Variations between these two sources can be partly explained by exchange rate calculations.
^17	  One interesting note is that the amount of household consumption estimated via the household survey was around US$24,500 million in 2005 -exactly the same amount estimated by the national account system of the Central Bank for that same year. But while household consumption estimates match perfectly between the two sources, we find great differences on remittances estimates.
^18	  The aim of this section is simply to present figures on the distribution of remittances among actual income groups. In this regard we are not interested, in this paper, in the real impact of remittances on income distribution. This factual is needed in order to correctly design co-development programmes. For this reason, no counterfactuals (à la Acosta et al. (2008b)) are provided.
^19	  According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ecuador records a Gini index of 0.536, compared to 0.42 in Thailand, 0.29 in Croatia, or 0.395 in Morocco.
^20	  The same source shows that remittances are evenly distributed among deciles 9 and 10. This means that slightly less than US$33 million of remittances are received by individuals with an income between $345.10 and $7,427.17/month.
^21	  Note that poverty lines for Ecuador are established by INEC at $56.64 per person/month, with extreme poverty below $31.92 per person/month.
^22	  Migration to the United States began several decades ago and records a longer track on remittance sending that may have had a medium- or long-term impact on household income (Jockisch and Pribilsky, 2002).
^23	  See Angrist (2004) on this issue.
